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Using objective institutional historical data we test the link between 
extent, duration, and transparency in democracies and rent-seeking 
behavior using time-series and panel data approaches.  In this paper we 
focus on the case of Uruguay, an ethnically homogeneous country.  We 
find three main results. First, democratic regimes are negatively linked 
with rent-seeking actions. Second, the longer the duration of democracy, 
the less rent-seeking in a society. Third, legislation enacted more 
transparently is negatively correlated with rent-seeking behavior. Our 
results are robust to the use of different econometric methods and basic 
robustness tests and are consistent with prevailing theory. 
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In this paper we empirically test the possible link between democracy and institutional 
quality, with particular focus on the extent to which political processes within a 
democracy may be related with rent-seeking behavior. According to recent theoretical 
research, not only do democracies reduce rent-seeking behavior, but they also improve 
the quality of a country’s institutions over time.
1  Furthermore, the more transparent the 
laws and regulations within democracies, the less likely the presence of bad institutions; 
likewise, the less opaque the political process, the better the property rights in the country 
and the lower the rent-seeking behavior in the society.  In fact, while passing laws may 
require a lengthy and widely discussed process in the legislature, other statutes, such as 
government resolutions, may require lower levels of political coordination, perhaps no 
more than executive approval. Furthermore, some regulations are likely to require even 
less political interaction, as they do not necessarily require approval from the higher 
levels of the executive branch of government and may thus follow a somewhat less 
transparent path.   
In fact, lack of data has not allowed for an adequate study of the above 
interactions between political characteristics and institutional features. Despite the fact 
that recent research has strongly focused on the impact of institutions on economic 
performance (e.g., Mauro, 1995, and Knack and Keefer, 1997) there is still little formal 
empirical evidence on the determinants of institutional quality, particularly political 
factors.  The few available studies are either mainly descriptive nature or use indirect or 
subjective data that, despite being widely employed, are controversial; these studies also 
tend to use cross-country approaches that may suffer from an omitted variables problem 
that cannot be controlled by simply applying fixed effects.
2 This may be particularly true in 
the context of recent research that shows the relevance of social capital, trust, and related 
variables (Fukuyama, 1995; Knack and Keefer, 1997; La Porta et al., 1997). In fact, it has 
been claimed that there are several problems with the use of subjective data in economic 
research (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2001). In the specific case of institutional data, one 
                                                 
1 Examples include Olson (1992), McGuire and Olson (1996), and Clague et al. (1996). 
2 Clague et al. (1999) offer a methodology that uses money supply which they call “contract-intensive 
money” that allows to construct an objective database on institutional quality. The data, however, have 
been criticized and thus have remained virtually unused. An exception is Chong and Zanforlin (2004). 
 
 
5problem is that evaluators may be influenced by a country’s economic conditions when 
assessing institutional efficiency, as they may assume that some specific institutional aspect 
cannot be severe if the country is doing well (Mauro, 1995). Furthermore, the absence of 
guidelines on what constitutes on what constitutes an “expert” evaluator may render such 
assessments essentially worthless.
3   
In this paper we take advantage of a very unusual and rich data set that allows us 
to address the important empirical restrictions of recent research. We use a historical 
time-series of objective rent-seeking data, based on discretionary foreign trade 
regulations, that permits us to explore the time-series dimension of the link between rent- 
seeking and democracy.
4 In particular, we choose the particular case of a small, 
historically stable, ethnically and culturally homogeneous Latin American country, 
Uruguay, which provides a natural experiment where ethnolinguistic heterogeneity can 
be effectively controlled.  This country provides an excellent natural laboratory from the 
point of view of a rent-seeking society, as it represents an extreme case of discretionary 
trade policies that lasted for decades. These policies were pursued by two means. The 
first was an import-substitution strategy that was characterized by high protective trade 
barriers, multiple exchange rates, import licenses, and an explicit policy that allocated 
discretionary foreign exchange, approved import licenses, and banned imports that 
competed with domestic production. The second was an export promotion strategy 
which, while not as unconcealed as the import-substitution approach, was nonetheless 
actively pursued for considerable periods (Rama, 1991).    
Based on time-series and panel data analysis we find strong evidence that 
democracies and rent-seeking are negatively linked. Furthermore, we find that the longer 
the duration of democracy, the lower the discretionary rent-seeking regulations in a 
country. Additionally, we provide evidence that the more transparent the regulations 
within a democracy, the less rent-seeking in the society. Finally, we show that the 
economy-wide behavior of the link between these two variables depends on the sector of 
                                                 
3 Mauro (1995) argues that the evidence for the accuracy and relevance of the indices is provided by the 
considerable price that clients are willing to pay in order to obtain for the assessments.   
4 There is some work in the literature related with the political economy of trade protection, in particular, to 
the process leading to transfers in favor of special interest groups.  Examples are Amelung (1989), Baldwin 
(1989), Hillman (1989), and Weck-Hannemann (1991). However, this work emphasizes case studies rather 
 
 
6analysis. In summary, we find that the answer to the question of whether democracies 
tend to breed rent-seeking behavior appears to be negative. Furthermore, it appears that 
the persistence of democratic values in societies and transparent political processes 
within democracies help to reduce rent-seeking behavior.   
This paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the data and 
provides basic statistics.  Section 3 focuses on the time-series evidence. Section 4 
provides panel data evidence across sectors and within the manufacturing sector, where 




We use legislative data originally collected by Rama (1994) for Uruguay for the period 
1925-1983 on a yearly basis.
5 This researcher painstakingly collects discretionary trade 
policy information published by the Official Registry of Laws and Decrees of this 
country.  He constructs a rent-seeking database for this country by individually counting 
the number of statutes that create, maintain, or modify a foreign-trade regulation for the 
benefit of a single firm or industry for the whole period. Examples include but are not 
limited to the following: tariffs on final goods, changes in import duties for inputs, export 
subsidies, special exchange rates, reference prices, draw-back regimes, import licenses, 
export prohibitions and tax payment relief. In all, at the firm level the available data set 
contains 4,042 observations or rent-seeking actions for the period 1925-1983. Depending 
on the empirical method employed, however, not all data are necessarily used. This 
selective approach is made possible by the richness of the data, which contain detailed 
information on the type of private rent-seeking resolution enacted, such as law, decree, or 
administrative regulation, the basic area to which the resolution was linked, either exports 
or imports, the corresponding productive sector, defined at the two-digit level ISIC code, 
and whether the petitioner was explicitly identified by name.
6   
                                                                                                                                                 
than not formal aggregate-level empirical evidence. An exception is Rama (1994), who uses some of the 
same data as this paper but focuses less on political processes per se and more on trade policy issues.  
5 The ending year corresponds to the last published issue of the data source (Rama, 1994). 
6 In many cases the identity of the recipient of the discretionary trade policy was not hidden.  Furthermore, 
the author argues that most promoters of regulations are private firms and guilds, frequently with 
remarkable lobbying ability (Rama, 1994). 
 
 
7In order to be consistent with the six-decade economic cycle represented in the sample, 
we scale our variable of interest using data on aggregate output level at constant prices; 
unfortunately, those data are available only from 1935 onward.
7  Additionally, we 
calculate an index where the average of rent-seeking actions during 1935 and 1983 equals 
100.
8.  Table 1 presents summary statistics of our variable of interest. Overall, we find 
that rent-seeking activities represent 45 percent of gross domestic product in Uruguay for 
the period 1925 to 1983, of which 47 percent of petitions may be linked to particular 
firms or persons.  Similarly, manufacturing represents the bulk of activities, accounting 
for more than 80 percent, and rent-seeking regulations linked with Imports outnumber 
those linked with Exports by about 20 percent points. Furthermore, Supreme Decrees are 
the legal device mostly used, with 67 issued.
9   In fact, typically government supreme 
resolutions require no more than executive approval, essentially avoiding political 
interaction and thus following a less transparent institutional path.  For the sake of 
comparison, Table 1 also includes a basic contrast between democratic and dictatorial 
regimes. Perhaps the most dramatic differences between these two are that discretionary 
trade actions during the latter occur mainly through tariff rather than non-tariff barriers 
and, unsurprisingly, through Supreme Resolutions instead of Supreme Decrees. 
Data on democracy and duration of democracy are from the well-known Polity IV 
data set by Gurr and Jaggers (2001), which is an annual index based on three categories 
that account for different characteristics of the political process.
10 This index of 
democracy goes from zero to ten with higher scores representing higher degrees of 
democracy. Additional data on the political process are from Henisz (2000) who derives a 
                                                 
7 Rama (1994) also uses exports and imports as additional deflators. When replicating our empirical work 
using these other deflators our findings do not change. In the interest of economy these findings are not 
reported but are available upon request. Data related with number of firms, the natural deflator, are not 
available.  
8 Note that although we have individual information on rent-seeking actions since 1925, the analysis begins 
with 1935 because of the lack of real GDP data prior to that date.  
9 Tariff barriers include (i) tariff rates or, in the case of exports, subsidy rates; (ii) the reference price used 
to calculate tariffs and subsidies, which are frequently used instead of the actual international price; and 
(iii) exchange rates, which from 1933 to 1959 were multiple exchange rates. Non-tariff barriers include the 
item’s position, quotas, and other non-price related barriers.  
10 The categories are executive recruitment, independence of authority, and political competition. The first 
measures the extent of institutionalization, the competitiveness of executive selection in terms of electoral 
systems, and the openness of executive recruitment.  The second reflects the extent to which preferences of 
third parties are taken into account. The third reflects the extent to which the political system allows the 
non-elite to influence the political elite. See also Gurr, Jaggers and Moore (1998).  
 
 
8measure of political constraints from a simple spatial model of political interaction that 
incorporates information on the number of independent branches of government with 
veto power and the distribution of preferences across and within those branches. It is 
scaled from zero to one, where the higher the number, the more restrictive the political 
decision-making of the country.  Additional standard controls, such as terms of trade, 
rates of growth, and others, come from Rama (1994), and the World Bank (2004).
11 In 
Table 2 we present simple correlation measures between rent-seeking and democracy. 
We find that the former is negatively correlated with democracy (-0.43) regardless of 
economic sector. Furthermore, rent-seeking is negatively associated with duration of 
democracy (-0.66) and our measure of political constraints (-0.08). 
 
3. Time-Series Evidence 
 
Our benchmark long-run time-series specification is: 
 
RSt
*  =  RS (dyt,   ISIt,   EPt,   PVt )     (1) 
 
                                                
where RSt
* represents the number of rent-seeking actions per year as a percentage of 
gross domestic product and dyt reflects the annual growth rate of the economy. We follow 
Rama (1994) and include the variables ISIt and EPt, which correspond to Import 
Substitution policies and Export Promotion policies, respectively. We assign a value of 1 
for the years when such policies were followed and zero otherwise.
12 Our variable of 
interest is PVt, which reflects (i) the quality of the democratic regime, (ii) the duration of 
democracy, and (iii) the extent of political constraints, as defined above.  
As shown by Rama (1993) the behavior of the government in undertaking action 
is not automatic and has some degree of adjustment. We consider an adaptive 
expectations scheme where the parameter γ affects the speed of adjustment.   
Consequently, RSt -RSt-1 = γ ( RSt
*- RSt-1), or RSt = γ RSt
*+ (1-γ )RSt-1, implying that (1) 
becomes: 
RSt  =  γ  RS (Dyt,  ISIt,  EPt,  PFt) +  (1-γ) RSt-1     (2) 
 
11 In particular, we use a simple measure of democracy variable that is similar to Gastil (1990).  When 
using this variable our results throughout this paper do not change. 
 
 
9Furthermore, if we assume a linear function, (2) becomes:  
 
RSt  =  β1Dyt  +  β2ISIt  +  β3EPt  +  β4PFt  +  β5 RSt-1  +  εt    (3) 
 
where β5 = 1 - γ represents the speed of adjustment for the government in undertaking 
actions on rent-seeking activities. In this reduced form we expect that higher rates of 
growth will be associated with lower incentives to undertake rent-seeking actions (β1<0). 
We also expect ISI and EP to enter with a positive coefficient, since both policies 
(import-substitution and export promotion) are discretionary (β2, β3 >0). With respect to 
the political variables, the current literature described above argues that rent-seeking 
actions may decrease in times of democracy, perhaps due to more accountability, more 
transparency or constraints, or increasing maturity of democracies. For instance, on the 
one hand, the lack of possibilities for criticizing decisions could increase the supply of 
protection by policymakers. On the other hand, reduced political competition could also 
lead to a lower demand for protection by parties. 
  In Table 3 we present regression estimates based on equation (3).  The rate of 
growth of real gross domestic product has a negative relationship with rent-seeking, 
although it is not statistically significant. The dummy variables that reflect import-
substitution and export-promotion strategies are both positive and statistically significant 
in all the specifications. More rent-seeking actions were pursued during such periods in 
the Uruguayan economy. Additionally, our rent-seeking variable shows a moderate 
degree of persistence, with the autoregressive coefficient ranging from 0.48 to 0.70. With 
respect to our variables of interest, we find that democracy has a negative and significant 
relationship with rent-seeking.  Furthermore, we find that duration of democracy also 
yields a negative and statistically significant association with rent-seeking and that higher 
political constraints in the policy decision process are also negatively and significantly 
associated with rent-seeking behavior. In fact, bear in mind that a one-point increase in 
the index of democracy is associated with a 2.89-point decline in the index of rent-
seeking in the short run, and an 8.3 decline in the long run. An additional year of 
democracy is linked with a decline of 1.67 points in the rent-seeking index in the short 
run, and a reduction of 3.2 points in the long run.  Similarly, a 10-percent increase in the 
                                                                                                                                                 
12 Import substitution and export promotion policies were sometimes carried out simultaneously. Thus, it is 
 
 
10index of political constraints measure is linked to a decline of 2.2 points of the rent-
seeking measure in the short run and a reduction of 7.3 points in the long run. 
  Just as noteworthy, Table 3 also shows findings when using either identified or 
non-identified rent-seeking actions as our dependent variables instead of using total rent-
seeking actions. Identified actions refer to those rent-seeking actions that explicitly 
identified a group, firm, or individual as the beneficiary of the discretionary trade policy. 
On the other hand, non-identified actions refer to those that did not explicitly identify a 
beneficiary of the rent-seeking policy or action. In this case, the prior is straightforward. 
Firms or groups that were not openly identified as beneficiaries of discretionary trade 
policies may have been able to extract higher rents.  As in the case of total rent-seeking 
actions, the political variables considered yield negative and statistically significant 
coefficients.
13 Interestingly, the coefficient estimates of the political variables when 
focusing on rent-seeking actions of identified beneficiaries are smaller than the ones 
estimated for non-identified beneficiaries. In particular, the differences in estimates are 
much larger in the case of democracy and political constraints than in the case of 
duration. While a one-point increase in the index of democracy leads to a short-run 
decline of 1.4 points in the index of identified rent-seeking actions and a 3.1 point decline 
in the long run, it leads to a decline of 2.5 points in the index of non-identified rent-
seeking actions in the short run and 5.1 points in the long run. Similarly, an additional 
year of democracy in Uruguay is linked with a decline of 0.46 points in the index of 
identified rent-seeking actions, but to a decline of 1.41 points in the index of non-
identified rent-seeking actions.  Finally, we find that the political constraints coefficient is 
statistically significant for non-identified rent-seeking actions, only. A 10-percentage 
point increase in the index of political constraints is linked with declines of 0.6 and 1.6 
points in the short run and the long run, respectively. In the case of non-identified actions, 
the decline is 2.3 and 4.8 points in the short and long run, respectively. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
not infrequent that the corresponding dummies equal one at the same time. 
13 An exception is the case of the political constraints with identifiable beneficiaries, which yields a 
coefficient with the expected negative sign; nonetheless, this finding is statistically insignificant.   
 
 
114. Additional Time-Series Evidence 
 
Table 4 shows the coefficient estimates of our variables of interest when classifying rent-
seeking by economic activity, trading activity, type of law, and type of rent-seeking 
action.  While we test the same specification (3) as before, for the sake of economy we 
report the coefficients of the variables of interest only. When focusing on the recipient of 
the discretionary trade policy in terms of economic activity and, in particular, in terms of 
differences between manufacturing and non-manufacturing industries, we find a negative 
and significant coefficient for all the political variables considered, even in the case of 
identified and non-identified actions. In particular, we find that (i) the negative 
coefficient of the political variable is larger for manufacturing rent-seeking actions than 
the one for non-manufacturing actions; and (ii) the estimates for non-identified actions in 
manufacturing activities are larger than for identified actions, while the opposite tends to 
occur for actions in the non-manufacturing sector. A one-point increase in the index of 
democracy is linked to a reduction of 2.6 points in the manufacturing rent-seeking 
variable, while the reduction of non-manufacturing rent-seeking variable is only 
approximately 0.84 points. Additionally, an additional year of democracy is linked to a 
reduction of 1.63 points in the index of rent-seeking in manufacturing but a reduction of 
0.15 points in non-manufacturing rent-seeking activities.
14 As before, the impact of non-
identified rent-seeking actions is larger than that of identified actions. A one-point 
increase in the index of democracy is related to a decline in the rent-seeking index of 1.2 
points for identified actions in the manufacturing sector and 2.3 points for non-identified 
actions in the same sector.
15 
In terms of rent-seeking actions by trading activity, rent-seeking actions favoring 
exporters are more likely linked with political variables than import activities. For 
instance, a one-point increase in the index of democracy is linked to a 2.2-point decline in 
rent-seeking actions favoring exporters, compared to only 1.1 points in the case of 
importers. Also, an additional year of democracy is related to a 1.4-percent decline in 
rent-seeking actions in exports, compared to a reduction of approximately 0.3 percent in 
                                                 
14 Furthermore, the coefficient is statistically insignificant in this case. 
15 In the case of non-manufacturing rent-seeking actions, a one-point increase in the index of democracy is 
associated with a decline in the index of identified actions by 0.56 points and by 0.22 points for non-
identified actions, although the impact is not significant in the latter. 
 
 
12action in imports.  Similarly, a 10-percent increase in the political constraints variable 
leads to a decline in the index of rent-seeking actions of 2.1 points for exporters and 0.3 
points for importers. Finally, unlike identified rent-seeking actions, non-identified rent-
seeking export actions display a strong and statistically significant association with the 
political variables considered in this study.
16  In the case of imports, the link between 
rent-seeking actions and political variables is not statistically significant in most cases, 
and when it is, the results are not robust. 
 When focusing on the type of law used when issuing discretionary policies in 
trade, we are more likely to find a negative and statistically significant coefficient when 
rent-seeking actions are implemented through supreme resolutions rather than supreme 
decrees. This is somewhat unsurprising as the former, more frequently attached to less 
democratic regimes, tend to be easier to hide and undo than the latter, which tend to be 
the outcome of more transparent interactions. The reduction of rent-seeking actions due 
to a one-point increase in the index of democracy when resolutions are made (1.81 
points) is almost twice the 0.98 point reduction when decrees are issued.
17 As before, we 
find that within resolutions, the impact of political variables on rent-seeking actions is 
stronger in the case of non-identified actions. An additional year of democracy is linked 
to a decline in the index of rent-seeking actions of 1 point for identified resolutions, and 
1.4 for non-identified resolutions. In the case of political constraints, the impact is only 
significant for non-identified actions. 
We additionally find that political variables tend to have a negative and 
significant association with either non-tariff or tariff-like actions. However, the declining 
effect on rent-seeking is stronger in the case of the latter. A one-point increase in the 
index of democracy is associated with a decrease of non-tariff actions of 1.1 points but of 
2.7 points in the case of tariff-like actions. An additional year of democracy leads to a 
decline in non-tariff actions of 0.5 but it leads to a decrease of 1.4 points in the case of 
tariff-like actions. Finally, an increase of 10 percent from the mean in the index of 
                                                 
16 A one-point increase in the index of democracy is associated with a decline of 2.4 points in the index of 
non-identified exports actions, while the decline for identified actions equals 0.15, which is not statistically 
significant. Similarly, a 10-percent increase from the mean in the index of political constraints is correlated 
with a 2-point decline in the index of actions in favor of non-identified export firms. Again, for identified 
rent-seeking actions the reduction is not statistically significant. 
 
 
13political constraints determines a decline of tariff-like actions of 2.3 points, and for non-
tariff actions of 0.5 points, where the latter is statistically insignificant.   
 
5. Panel Data Evidence 
 
We repeat the previous analysis but use panel data for three economic sectors, 
agriculture, manufacturing, and services. We reformulate our regression equation (3) as: 
 
RSit  =  β1Dyit +  β2ISIit + β3EPit +  β4PFit  + β5  RSi,t-1 + µi + εi,t    (4) 
 
where  µi represents the sector-specific effect.  In Table 5 we report a fixed-effects 
estimator and, analogous to previous results, we find that our variables of interest have a 
negative and statistically significant relationship with rent-seeking. As before, we also 
find that the coefficient of the political variable is higher in regressions involving non-
identified actions than in the ones using identified actions.  A one-point increase in the 
index of democracy is associated with a 2.7-point decrease in the index of rent-seeking 
actions. The impact of a longer-lasting democracy is stronger for non-identified actions, 
resulting in a decline of 1.8 points as compared to 0.9 points in the case of identified 
actions.  As in the time-series case, we also study different layers of actions and report 
the results in Table 6. When focusing on the type of trading, we find that better 
democracies, that is, those that are stronger, more durable, and with fewer political 
constraints, are linked with a decline in rent-seeking actions. This is particularly true in 
the case of exporters, which appears to be driven mainly by the negative and statistically 
significant relationship in the non-identified case. On the other hand, political variables 
also yield a negative association with rent-seeking actions classified by type of law, as 
also shown in Table 6. However, this negative coefficient is statistically significant only 
in the case of actions issued through Supreme Resolutions and tends to be larger, in 
absolute value, for non-identified actions. Finally, the reduction of rent-seeking actions 
linked with better democracy is stronger when we consider tariff-like actions than when 
                                                                                                                                                 
17 The difference is even larger for duration of democracy (1.24 vs. 0.32 points due to an additional year of 
democracy). Also, the impact of the index of political constraints is not statistically significant. 
 
 
14considering non-tariff like actions. Once again, within the group of tariff-like actions, the 
effect is larger for actions directed to non-identified agents.
18 
  Given that rent-seeking actions are heavily concentrated in the manufacturing 
sector data, it is possible to use the two-digit International Standard Industry 
Classification (ISIC) codes to identify the different manufacturing activities that were 
granted protection during the period under study. We divide the manufacturing sector 
into the following activities: (i) Manufacture of Food, Beverages and Tobacco (Code 31), 
(ii) Textile, Wearing Apparel and Leather Industries (code 32), (iii) Manufacture of Paper 
and Paper Products, Printing and Publishing (code 34), (iv) Manufacture of Chemicals 
and Chemical, Petroleum, Coal, Rubber and Plastic Products (code 35), (v) Manufacture 
of Non-Metallic Mineral Products, except Products of Petroleum and Coal (code 36), (vi) 
Manufacture of Fabricated Metal Products, Machinery and Equipment (code 38), (vii) 
Rest of Manufacturing (codes 33, 37, and 39).   
In Table 7 we present our baseline fixed-effects regression estimates, which are 
analogous to those presented in Table 5 for the panel data set of three economic sectors.  
We also find here that rent-seeking actions across manufacturing activities are negatively 
associated with all our variables of interest. However, this negative relationship is 
statistically significant only in the case of duration of democracy and the index of 
political constraints. Interestingly, the index of democracy is not statistically significant. 
Consistent with previous results, the impact of a more durable democracy or more 
constraints on political interaction is stronger among non-identified than among identified 
rent-seeking actions.
19  
                                                 
18  While in the estimations above we implicitly imposed homogeneity of coefficients across sectors, this 
however, might not be the case as not only do intercepts may differ but also the coefficient of the variable 
of interest across economic sectors. When allowing for heterogeneous slopes we find that the effects of 
political variables on rent-seeking actions may be channeled through the manufacturing sector.  If we 
increase the index of democracy by one point, the index of rent-seeking actions in manufacturing will 
decrease by 2.25 points while the index of identified (non-identified) actions on manufacturing declines by 
0.6 (2.26) points. Agriculture and services are not statistically significant  
19 In this case, another year of democracy would imply a decline in the index of rent-seeking actions of 0.05 
(0.08) points in the short (long) run among identified actions, while it declines 0.16 (0.24) points in the 
short (long) run among non-identified actions. On the other hand, a 10-percent increase from the mean of 
the index of political constraints would be associated with a decrease in the index of rent-seeking actions of 
0.05 (0.08) points in the short (long) run among identified actions, while it declines 0.21 (0.33) points in the 
short (long) run among non-identified actions. 
 
 
15Table 8 further analyzes the interaction between political variables and rent-
seeking by focusing on the same rent-seeking sub-categories as before. As before, we 
find that discretionary trade policy actions directed towards exporters have a negative and 
significant association with political variables in most cases. Also as before, in non-
identified cases the impact tends to be stronger.
20 Additionally, in this case rent-seeking 
actions issued through supreme decrees, either identified or non-identified, have no 
robust relationship with the index of democracy. On the other hand, democracy is mostly 
linked to rent-seeking actions issued through supreme resolutions. This finding appears to 
be mainly driven by the impact on resolutions that do not identify the favored agents. Its 
impact is not only larger, but also statistically significant relative to supreme resolutions 
affecting identified agents. Finally, we find that political variables have no significant 
association with rent-seeking via non-tariff-related actions. In most cases, the relationship 
changes sign and becomes positive, although it remains statistically insignificant. In 
contrast, better democracies are related to lower rent-seeking actions in the form of tariff-
like policies. This result holds for identified and non-identified tariff-like actions when 
using duration of democracy and political constraints. In these two cases we also find that 
the impact is stronger for actions that do not identify favored agents. An additional year 
of democracy is linked to a decline in the index of tariff-like actions of 0.15 points, with 
the decline for identified and non-identified agents being equal to 0.06 and 0.14 points, 
respectively. In the case of political constraints, the differences are smaller. A 10-percent 
increase from the mean is associated with declines of 0.11 and 0.17 points, respectively, 
in tariff-like actions for identified and non-identified agents.
21 
 
                                                 
20 However, we find that actions in favor of importers have a positive relationship although not necessarily 
statistically significant, especially, in the case of identified actions.   
21 When allowing for heterogeneous slopes we find that the political variables have a negative and 
significant relationship with rent-seeking across manufacturing activities. There are some differences 
though. We find a robust negative relationship between democracy and rent-seeking in textiles (ISIC 32) 
and metal products (ISIC 38). In textiles, this negative and significant relationship holds for both identified 
and non-identified actions. We find that the impact of better democracy is stronger for non-identified 
actions. In the case of metal products, we find that the negative and significant relationship between rent-
seeking actions and democracy is mainly driven by non-identified actions. We also find that the impact of a 
better democracy is stronger for non-identified actions, regardless of the democracy indicators.  
 
 
166.  Conclusions 
 
There is a backlash against democracies in several countries, as they have been linked 
with rent-seeking behavior, corruption, and other recent institutional problems in many 
countries in both Eastern Europe and Latin America. While it may be argued that young 
democracies tend to struggle with inefficient institutional behavior, the conventional 
wisdom suggests that, once democracies take hold and political constraints are 
minimized, institutions will improve and rent-seeking behavior will thus subside.  In fact, 
according to the theory of encompassing interest, rulers with expectations of having a 
long tenure in power have an incentive to provide good institutions in the form of 
adequate property rights, an enforceable rule of law, and an efficient judiciary system 
(Olson, 1992; Wittman, 1989).  This is because, in a repeated game context, good 
institutions and good policies are expected to contribute towards the growth and stability 
of the economy, which will thus translate in higher permanent returns for the ruler in the 
form of taxes and other rents.  In short, duration of democracies matters.  While the 
experience of the newly installed democratic regimes of the former Soviet republics is 
does not necessarily contradict the encompassing interest view, as these typically involve 
embryonic processes, the relatively more mature democracies in Latin America appear to 
be somewhat at odds with such paradigm. After all, most countries in this region re-
introduced democratic regimes during the early 1980s and, for the most part, have kept 
such regimes ever since.  Still, the common view of broad institutional weakness and, in 
particular, the perception of widespread rent-seeking and corruption deeply permeates 
society.   
With the aim of better understanding the issues above, in this paper we use 
objective institutional historical data to test the link between extent, duration, and 
transparency in democracies and rent-seeking behavior using time-series and panel data 
approaches.  In order to minimize recent criticisms on country heterogeneity we focus on 
the case of Uruguay, an ethnically homogeneous country.  Overall, we find three main 
results. First, democratic regimes are negatively linked with rent-seeking actions. Second, 
the longer the duration of democracy, the less rent-seeking in a society. Third, legislation 
enacted more transparently is negatively correlated with rent-seeking behavior. Our 
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20Table 1. Summary Statistics 
 Full  Sample Democracy Dictatorship
Total Actions 100.00 85.62 122.70
(42.5)                  (34.3)                  (45.1)                 
- Identified 47.0                   43.5                   52.6                  
(21.7)                  (18.2)                  (25.9)                 
- Non-Identified 53.0                   42.1                   70.1                  
(29.0)                  (20.6)                  (32.6)                 
By Economic Activity
- Manufacturing 81.01 67.52 102.31
(37.4)                  (29.5)                  (39.4)                 
- Non-Manufacturing 18.99 18.11 20.39
(11.0)                  (8.1)                    (14.5)                 
By Trading Activity
- Exports 40.58 24.57 65.86
(36.1)                  (21.4)                  (40.5)                 
- Imports 59.30 60.92 56.74
(27.3)                  (18.2)                  (37.9)                 
By Type of Law
- Supreme Decree 67.26 73.66 57.16
(32.2)                  (25.6)                  (39.2)                 
- Supreme Resolution 32.51 11.92 65.01
(37.1)                  (18.9)                  (35.5)                 
By Type of Action
- Non-Tariff Barriers 49.53 49.80 49.11
(21.5)                  (18.0)                  (26.8)                 
- Tariff Barriers 44.24 30.46 65.99
(31.4)                  (21.5)                  (32.6)                 
Notes: Rent-seeking actions in Uruguay as percentage of gross domestic product, 1935-1983. Average total 





















21Table 2. Rent-Seeking and Political Process: Simple Correlation 
 
Democracy Duration of Political
Actions  Democracy Constraints
Total Actions -0.432 -0.658 -0.083
(0.00)                  (0.00)                  (0.56)                 
- Identified -0.285 -0.489 0.171
(0.05)                  (0.00)                  (0.24)                 
- Non-Identified -0.419 -0.598 -0.250
(0.01)                  (0.00)                  (0.09)                 
By Economic Activity
- Manufacturing -0.465 -0.688 -0.191
(0.00)                  (0.00)                  (0.19)                 
- Non-Manufacturing -0.087 -0.204 0.328
(0.54)                  (0.16)                  (0.03)                 
By Trading Activity
- Exports -0.586 -0.655 -0.515
(0.00)                  (0.00)                  (0.00)                 
- Imports 0.104 -0.157 0.551
(0.47)                  (0.28)                  (0.00)                 
By Type of Law
- Supreme Decree 0.194 -0.046 0.501
(0.18)                  (0.75)                  (0.00)                 
- Supreme Resolution -0.664 -0.711 -0.535
(0.00)                  (0.00)                  (0.00)                 
By Type of Action
- Non-Tariff Barriers -0.001 -0.312 0.448
(0.99)                  (0.03)                  (0.00)                 
- Tariff Barriers -0.563 -0.651 -0.440
(0.00)                  (0.00)                  (0.00)                 












Table 3. Political Determinants of Rent-Seeking: Time-Series Evidence 
Total Actions Identified Actions Non-Identified Actions
Index of Duration of Political Index of Duration of Political Index of  Duration of Political
Democracy Democracy Constraints Democracy Democracy Constraints Democracy Democracy Constraints
Constant 14.8438 29.3692 ** 12.9427 4.1024 4.2425 0.5722 21.5908 ** 31.2589 ** 22.5615 **
(12.76)                     (13.10)            (11.93)             (4.89)                       (4.84)              (4.57)               (10.78)            (10.15)            (11.12)            
Rent-Seeking Actions 0.6508 ** 0.4762 ** 0.6916 ** 0.5476 ** 0.5227 ** 0.6431 ** 0.5050 ** 0.3291 ** 0.5237 **
     lagged 1 period (0.10)                       (0.12)              (0.08)               (0.12)                       (0.12)              (0.10)               (0.12)              (0.14)              (0.11)              
Growth in Real GDP -77.7642 -112.8507 * -61.9632 -5.7783 -15.3098 -8.6579 -66.3959 -111.4236 ** -47.7182
(64.87)                     (60.37)            (65.45)             (34.79)                     (33.86)            (35.33)             (65.28)            (54.33)            (62.85)            
Export Promotion 32.1278 ** 48.6469 ** 29.6766 ** 18.7098 ** 22.4269 ** 17.4866 ** 16.5223 29.2829 ** 14.7206
(12.47)                     (12.61)            (12.42)             (4.85)                       (5.31)              (4.94)               (12.09)            (12.00)            (11.87)            
Import Substitution 38.8088 ** 45.1903 ** 55.7345 ** 26.6619 ** 25.1463 ** 26.3622 ** 20.2062 ** 21.4966 ** 40.3440 **
(12.52)                     (11.46)            (18.20)             (7.43)                       (6.73)              (9.52)               (10.26)            (8.77)              (16.50)            
Political Variable -2.8927 * -1.6706 ** -74.6346 * -1.3956 ** -0.4597 ** -18.9422 -2.5021 ** -1.4091 ** -75.8084 **
(1.50)                       (0.51)              (38.74)             (0.65)                       (0.22)              (14.14)             (1.19)              (0.39)              (36.65)            
R-Squared 0.7054 0.7505 0.7052 0.7307 0.7331 0.7123 0.4879 0.5865 0.4993
Notes: (**) reflects statistical significance at five percent or higher; (*) reflects statistical significance at ten percent. Results are based on specification (3); the 
explanatory political variable is one of the following variables: (i) index of democracy, (ii) duration of democracy, or (iii) political constraints, depending on the 
column, as indicated on the heading. Identified actions refer to those rent-seeking actions that explicitly identified a group, firm, or individual as the beneficiary 
of the discretionary trade policy. On the other hand, non-identified actions refer to those that did not explicitly identify a beneficiary. The dependent variable is 









23Table 4 Time-Series Robustness Tests 
 
Index of Duration of Political
Democracy Democracy Constraints
ECONOMIC ACTIVITY
Manufacturing Sector -2.5662 * -1.6393 ** -63.8714 *
(1.35)                        (0.48)                  (35.94)            
 - Manufacturing, Identified -1.1873 ** -0.5289 ** -18.2158
(0.52)                        (0.17)                  (12.82)            
 - Manufacturing, Non-Identified -2.2790 ** -1.3420 ** -65.3688 **
(1.09)                        (0.38)                  (33.01)            
Non-Manufacturing Sector -0.8445 ** -0.1482 -19.1508 **
(0.35)                        (0.12)                  (6.73)              
 - Non-Manufacturing, Identified -0.5633 ** -0.0626 -8.1802 **
(0.22)                        (0.08)                  (4.06)              
 - Non-Manufacturing, Non-Identified -0.2201 -0.0528 -8.5018
(0.28)                        (0.09)                  (6.66)              
TRADING ACTIVITY
Exports, Total Actions -2.1843 ** -1.4364 ** -69.7855 **
(1.11)                        (0.40)                  (33.26)            
 - Exports, Identified -0.1466 -0.1699 ** -10.9047 *
(0.19)                        (0.06)                  (6.60)              
 - Exports, Non-Identified -2.3644 ** -1.3509 ** -65.0000 **
(0.99)                        (0.36)                  (28.02)            
Imports, Total Actions -1.0940 -0.2663 -10.3420
(0.78)                        (0.23)                  (23.70)            
 - Imports, Identified -0.9125 * -0.1412 -5.1861
(0.52)                        (0.18)                  (11.27)            
 - Imports, Non-Identified 0.8445 0.2191 21.1161
(0.65)                        (0.18)                  (21.98)            
TYPE OF LAW
Supreme Decree, Total Actions -0.9752 -0.3175 -34.6726
(0.93)                        (0.27)                  (26.98)            
 - Supreme Decree, Identified 0.0249 0.0884 -6.1441
(0.50)                        (0.15)                  (13.79)            
 - Supreme Decree, Non-Identified -1.0568 -0.4267 ** -28.7058
(0.75)                        (0.21)                  (23.81)            
Supreme Resolution, Total Actions -1.8075 * -1.2385 ** -32.6781
(1.04)                        (0.36)                  (26.88)            
 - Supreme Resolution, Identified -1.0509 * -0.5015 ** -6.1340
(0.67)                        (0.16)                  (14.52)            
 - Supreme Resolution, Non-Identified -1.4148 ** -0.8928 ** -44.1670 *
(0.70)                        (0.31)                  (23.70)            
TYPE OF ACTION
Non-Tariff-related Actions -1.1274 * -0.4550 ** -16.2933
(0.65)                        (0.20)                  (15.78)            
 - Non-Tariff, Identified -0.7513 -0.3143 * -5.5996
(0.56)                        (0.17)                  (12.33)            
 - Non-Tariff, Non-Identified -0.1008 -0.0582 -7.1409
(0.34)                        (0.11)                  (8.71)              
Tariff-related Actions -2.6916 ** -1.4356 ** -74.2082 *
(1.14)                        (0.39)                  (41.60)            
 - Tariff, Identified -0.8549 ** -0.2605 ** -31.7481 **
(0.28)                        (0.12)                  (9.24)              
 - Tariff, Non-Identified -2.1665 ** -1.1723 ** -60.2165 *
(1.04)                        (0.34)                  (34.03)            
Notes: (**) reflects statistical significance at five percent or higher; (*) reflects statistical significance at ten percent. Results are 
based on specification (3) but only the coefficients of the variables of interest (index of democracy, duration of democracy, 
political constraints) are reported. The dependent variable is the annual number of rent-seeking actions in Uruguay between 1935 
and 1983 adjusted by gross domestic product and classified in terms of economic activity, trading activity, type of law, and type 
of action, and by whether they identified the beneficiary or not. They are shown in the first column. The numbers in parentheses 
are robust standard errors. 
 
 
24Table 5. Political Determinants of Rent-Seeking: Panel Data Evidence 
Total Actions Identified Actions Non-Identified Actions
Index of Duration of Political Index of Duration of Political Index of Duration of Political
 Democracy Democracy Constraints Democracy Democracy Constraints Democracy Democracy Constraints
Rent-Seeking Actions 0.7219 ** 0.6880 ** 0.7301 ** 0.6305 ** 0.6208 ** 0.6501 ** 0.6079 ** 0.5693 ** 0.6122 **
     lagged 1 period (0.07)              (0.07)              (0.07)               (0.11)                       (0.11)              (0.11)               (0.09)              (0.09)              (0.09)              
Growth in Real GDP 4.4847 2.2899 5.7740 14.2638 ** 13.5112 ** 14.4665 ** -8.2234 -10.6832 -6.8877
(12.53)            (11.77)            (12.78)             (5.41)                       (5.32)              (5.41)               (12.51)            (11.79)            (12.70)            
Export Promotion 7.7122 * 10.1313 ** 7.4035 4.6728 ** 5.4315 ** 4.5591 ** 3.7888 5.9767 3.5344
(4.98)              (4.98)              (5.02)               (2.13)                       (2.18)              (2.13)               (4.37)              (4.38)              (4.39)              
Import Substitution 8.8754 ** 8.3443 ** 14.9009 ** 6.5462 ** 6.0726 ** 7.9095 ** 4.4214 3.6707 10.2998 **
(4.03)              (3.99)              (5.08)               (2.24)                       (2.17)              (2.67)               (3.38)              (3.28)              (4.54)              
Political Variable -0.7539 ** -0.3452 ** -22.4003 ** -0.3211 ** -0.1111 ** -6.8125 * -0.6990 ** -0.3274 ** -21.3061 **
(0.36)              (0.12)              (10.18)             (0.15)                       (0.05)              (4.05)               (0.32)              (0.10)              (9.44)              
Fixed Effects for:
 - Agriculture -2.2675 -1.9622 -1.8296 -3.6079 ** -3.7091 ** -3.5613 ** 1.8092 2.3404 2.2324
(3.83)              (3.71)              (3.90)               (1.80)                       (1.79)              (1.81)               (3.25)              (3.14)              (3.32)              
 - Manufacturing 17.3616 ** 20.1649 ** 17.1867 ** 9.1731 ** 9.4463 ** 8.4645 ** 16.1560 ** 18.0558 ** 16.4218 **
(7.33)              (7.36)              (7.13)               (4.05)                       (4.11)              (3.98)               (5.65)              (5.63)              (5.59)              
 - Services -3.2562 -3.0529 -2.7973 -3.2364 * -3.3202 * -3.2187 * 0.0280 0.3877 0.4649
(3.84)              (3.71)              (3.93)               (1.79)                       (1.78)              (1.81)               (3.22)              (3.09)              (3.30)              
R-Squared 0.8873 0.8903 0.8876 0.8922 0.8929 0.8914 0.7890 0.7611 0.7530
Notes: (**) reflects statistical significance at five percent or higher; (*) reflects statistical significance at ten percent. Results are based on specification (4). The 
explanatory political variable is one of the following variables: (i) index of democracy, (ii) duration of democracy, or (iii) political constraints, depending on the 
column, as indicated in the heading. Identified actions refer to those rent-seeking actions that explicitly identified a group, firm, or individual as the beneficiary 
of the discretionary trade policy. On the other hand, non-identified actions refer to those that did not explicitly identify a beneficiary. The dependent variable is 
the annual number of rent-seeking actions in Uruguay between 1935 and 1983 adjusted by gross domestic product. Since these are panel data regressions by 
sector the total number of observations in each regression is 144. We report constants for the three sectors analyzed here, manufacturing, agriculture, and 





Table 6. Robustness Tests with Panel Data 
 
Index of Duration of Political
Dependent Variable Democracy Democracy Constraints
TRADING ACTIVITY
Exports, Total Actions -0.4706 * -0.2495 ** -16.2307 **
(0.26)            (0.10)            (6.76)           
 - Exports, Identified -0.0182 -0.0377 * -1.9470
(0.06)            (0.02)            (1.60)           
 - Exports, Non-Identified -0.5558 ** -0.2506 ** -16.6944 **
(0.23)            (0.09)            (6.18)           
Imports, Total Actions -0.2293 -0.0595 -3.2414
(0.26)            (0.07)            (7.72)           
 - Imports, Identified -0.1739 -0.0268 -2.2514
(0.14)            (0.04)            (3.53)           
 - Imports, Non-Identified 0.1786 0.0318 5.0043
(0.19)            (0.05)            (6.18)           
TYPE OF LAW
Supreme Decree, Total Actions -0.2514 -0.0857 -10.6123
(0.32)            (0.09)            (8.99)           
 - Supreme Decree, Identified 0.0582 0.0372 -1.7948
(0.16)            (0.04)            (4.41)           
 - Supreme Decree, Non-Identified -0.3131 -0.1269 * -8.7290
(0.26)            (0.07)            (7.55)           
Supreme Resolution, Total Actions -0.3937 * -0.2181 ** -8.2595
(0.23)            (0.08)            (6.43)           
 - Supreme Resolution, Identified -0.2870 * -0.1272 ** -3.1447
(0.15)            (0.04)            (4.15)           
 - Supreme Resolution, Non-Identified -0.2910 * -0.1455 ** -9.0812 *
(0.16)            (0.06)            (4.86)           
TYPE OF ACTION
Non-Tariff-related Actions -0.3384 * -0.1359 ** -5.3727
(0.19)            (0.06)            (4.79)           
 - Non-Tariff, Identified -0.1653 -0.0779 ** -1.9123
(0.13)            (0.04)            (3.32)           
 - Non-Tariff, Non-Identified -0.0596 -0.0310 -2.4944
(0.10)            (0.03)            (3.02)           
Tariff-related Actions -0.6136 ** -0.2561 ** -17.6830 **
(0.29)            (0.09)            (8.86)           
 - Tariff, Identified -0.1735 ** -0.0467 * -5.8464 **
(0.07)            (0.03)            (2.06)           
 - Tariff, Non-Identified -0.5718 ** -0.2611 ** -16.2772 *
(0.27)            (0.09)            (8.47)           
Notes: (**) reflects statistical significance at five percent or higher; (*) reflects statistical significance at ten percent. 
Results are based on specification (4), but only the coefficients of the variables of interest (index of democracy, 
duration of democracy, and political constraints) are reported The explanatory political variable is one of the following 
variables: (i) index of democracy, (ii) duration of democracy, or (iii) political constraints, depending on the column, as 
indicated in the heading. The dependent variable is the annual number of rent-seeking actions in Uruguay between 
1935 and 1983 adjusted by gross domestic product and classified in terms of economic activity, trading activity, type of 
law, and type of action, and by whether they identified the beneficiary or not. They are shown in the first column. Since 
these are panel data regressions by sector the total number of observations in each regression is 196. The numbers in 




27Table 7. Rent-Seeking in the Manufacturing Sector Using Panel Data 
 
Total Actions Identified Actions Non-Identified Actions
Index of Duration of Political Index of Duration of Political Index of Duration of Political
Variable Democracy Democracy Constraints Democracy Democracy Constraints Democracy Democracy Constraints
Rent-Seeking Actions 0.4650 ** 0.3858 ** 0.4430 ** 0.3794 ** 0.3509 ** 0.3742 ** 0.3679 ** 0.2915 ** 0.3439 **
     lagged 1 period (0.08)            (0.08)              (0.08)            (0.07)            (0.07)                  (0.08)            (0.08)            (0.08)             (0.08)           
Growth in Real GDP 1.2117 0.5080 0.9789 1.8667 1.6529 1.7743 -0.2252 -1.0053 -0.4761
(3.67)            (3.45)              (3.59)            (1.52)            (1.48)                  (1.50)            (3.23)            (3.06)             (3.15)           
Export Promotion 4.2012 ** 5.4505 ** 4.2210 ** 2.4009 ** 2.7195 ** 2.4198 ** 2.0825 * 3.0469 ** 2.0617 *
(1.36)            (1.34)              (1.35)            (0.66)            (0.67)                  (0.66)            (1.08)            (1.10)             (1.08)           
ISI Policies -0.0798 3.1576 * 2.2394 1.7058 * 2.5914 ** 2.0546 ** -2.0287 0.5991 0.2108
(1.92)            (1.76)              (2.15)            (0.90)            (0.77)                  (0.95)            (1.55)            (1.45)             (1.81)           
Political Variable -0.1579 -0.2011 ** -7.7702 ** -0.0530 -0.0536 ** -1.6378 -0.1368 -0.1691 ** -7.2678 **
(0.16)            (0.05)              (3.55)            (0.08)            (0.02)                  (1.61)            (0.12)            (0.04)             (2.91)           
Fixed Effects for:
 - ISIC 31: Food, Beverages and 4.3101 ** 5.3210 ** 4.8781 ** 0.5469 0.6541 0.6042 4.7706 ** 5.5324 ** 5.2952 **
                 Tobacco (1.62)            (1.59)              (1.65)            (0.61)            (0.60)                  (0.61)            (1.31)            (1.31)             (1.34)           
 - ISIC 32: Textile, Apparel and 8.4094 ** 10.0541 ** 9.1530 ** 3.2561 ** 3.4948 ** 3.3376 ** 6.8846 ** 7.9058 ** 7.4906 **
                Leather (2.26)            (2.18)              (2.25)            (0.98)            (0.99)                  (1.01)            (1.79)            (1.73)             (1.77)           
 - ISIC 34: Paper, Printing and 0.5740 1.0668 0.9990 -0.6584 -0.6007 -0.6094 1.6067 * 2.0110 ** 2.0191 **
                Publishing (1.15)            (1.12)              (1.17)            (0.54)            (0.54)                  (0.54)            (0.86)            (0.84)             (0.88)           
 - ISIC 35: Chemicals 9.0804 ** 10.8562 ** 9.8601 ** 4.9495 ** 5.2748 ** 5.0467 ** 5.9961 ** 6.9072 ** 6.5675 **
(2.79)            (2.83)              (2.80)            (1.27)            (1.30)                  (1.29)            (1.76)            (1.75)             (1.75)           
 - ISIC 36: Non-Metallic Minerals 0.1037 0.5248 0.5082 -0.9572 * -0.9124 * -0.9114 * 1.3699 * 1.7297 ** 1.7683 **
(1.17)            (1.13)              (1.19)            (0.52)            (0.51)                  (0.52)            (0.88)            (0.85)             (0.89)           
 - ISIC 38: Metal Products,  5.0713 ** 6.1563 ** 5.6589 ** 1.4352 * 1.5815 ** 1.4985 * 4.7462 ** 5.4593 ** 5.2554 **
                Machinery & Equipment (1.65)            (1.61)              (1.67)            (0.77)            (0.75)                  (0.78)            (1.27)            (1.22)             (1.27)           
 - Rest of Manufacturing 2.0297 2.7531 ** 2.5175 * 0.2114 0.3103 0.2666 2.4894 ** 2.9886 ** 2.9315 **
(1.37)            (1.31)              (1.38)            (0.63)            (0.63)                  (0.64)            (1.00)            (0.95)             (1.01)           
R-Squared 0.6371 0.6626 0.6440 0.6121 0.6201 0.6129 0.4689 0.5089 0.4827
Notes: (**) reflects statistical significance at five percent or higher; (*) reflects statistical significance at ten percent. Results are based on specification (4). The 
explanatory political variable is one of the following variables: (i) index of democracy, (ii) duration of democracy, or (iii) political constraints, depending on the 
column, as indicated on the heading. Identified actions refer to those rent-seeking actions that explicitly identified a group, firm, or individual as the beneficiary of 
the discretionary trade policy. On the other hand, non-identified actions refer to those that did not explicitly identify a beneficiary. The dependent variable is the 
annual number of rent-seeking actions in Uruguay between 1935 and 1983 adjusted by gross domestic product by manufacturing sub-category. We report constants 
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Index of Duration of Political
Democracy Democracy Constraints
TRADING ACTIVITY
Exports, Total Actions -0.1113 -0.1420 ** -6.8397 **
(0.08)            (0.03)            (2.17)           
 - Exports, Identified -0.0096 -0.0382 ** -1.5547 **
(0.03)            (0.01)            (0.68)           
 - Exports, Non-Identified -0.1584 ** -0.1370 ** -7.1092 **
(0.07)            (0.03)            (2.02)           
Imports, Total Actions 0.2040 * 0.0379 5.8993 **
(0.12)            (0.03)            (2.67)           
 - Imports, Identified 0.0229 0.0071 1.5858
(0.07)            (0.02)            (1.43)           
 - Imports, Non-Identified 0.2095 ** 0.0455 ** 5.3214 **
(0.07)            (0.02)            (1.91)           
TYPE OF LAW
Supreme Decree, Total Actions 0.0169 -0.0498 -0.9279
(0.13)            (0.04)            (3.06)           
 - Supreme Decree, Identified -0.0296 -0.0171 -0.6457
(0.08)            (0.02)            (1.59)           
 - Supreme Decree, Non-Identified 0.0529 -0.0331 -0.1117
(0.09)            (0.03)            (2.29)           
Supreme Resolution, Total Actions -0.0417 -0.0876 ** -2.6425 *
(0.06)            (0.02)            (1.72)           
 - Supreme Resolution, Identified -0.0026 -0.0262 ** -0.3343
(0.03)            (0.01)            (0.88)           
 - Supreme Resolution, Non-Identified -0.0879 * -0.0905 ** -4.0026 **
(0.05)            (0.02)            (1.50)           
TYPE OF ACTION
Non-Tariff-related Actions 0.0874 -0.0142 1.1132
(0.09)            (0.03)            (2.04)           
 - Non-Tariff, Identified 0.0824 -0.0071 1.4008
(0.06)            (0.02)            (1.27)           
 - Non-Tariff, Non-Identified -0.0008 -0.0071 -0.4722
(0.06)            (0.01)            (1.32)           
Tariff-related Actions -0.1767 * -0.1526 ** -6.7294 **
(0.10)            (0.04)            (2.75)           
 - Tariff, Identified -0.1387 ** -0.0572 ** -3.6053 **
(0.04)            (0.01)            (0.77)           
 - Tariff, Non-Identified -0.1133 -0.1372 ** -5.6465 **
(0.09)            (0.03)            (2.43)           
Notes: (**) reflects statistical significance at 5 percent or higher; (*) reflects statistical significance at 10  
percent. Results are based on specification (4), but only the coefficients of the variables of interest (index of 
democracy, duration of democracy, and political constraints) are reported The explanatory political variable 
is either one of the following variables: (i) index of democracy, (ii) duration of democracy, or (iii) political 
constraints, depending on the column, as indicated on the heading. The dependent variable is the annual 
number of rent-seeking actions in Uruguay between 1935 and 1983 adjusted by gross domestic product and 
manufacturing sub-category and classified in terms of economic activity, trading activity, type of law, and 
type of action, and by whether they identified the beneficiary or not. They are shown in the first column. 
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